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Abstract
Ambiguity sensitive preferences must fail either Consequentialism or Dynamic Con-
sistency (DC), two properties that are compatible with subjective expected utility
and Bayesian updating, while forming the basis of backward induction and dynamic
programming. We examine the connection between these properties in a general
environment of convex preferences over monetary acts and find that, far from being
incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. In single-agent
decision problems, positive value of information characterises one direction of DC.
We propose a weakening of DC and show that one direction is equivalent to weakly
valuable information, whereas the other characterises the Bayesian updating of the
subjective beliefs which are revealed by trading behavior.
Keywords Updating · Ambiguity · Dynamic consistency · Bayesian ·
Consequentialism · Value of information
JEL Classification D81 · D83 · D91
1 Introduction
In dynamic-choice problems under uncertainty, the decision maker updates his prefer-
ences and his beliefs as new information arrives, taking optimal actions in each period.
Two are the most widely used constraints on how these preferences are updated. The
This paper supersedes the paper “Dynamic Consistency and Subjective Beliefs”. I am grateful to the editor
and two referees, Alain Chateauneuf, Michèle Cohen, Martin Cripps, Adam Dominiak, Paolo Ghirardato,
Jürgen Eichberger, Larry G. Epstein, Tassos Karantounias, Peter Klibanoff, Stelios Kotronis, Jean-Philippe
Lefort, Jian Li, Sujoy Mukerji, Pietro Ortoleva, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon and audiences at CRETE
2014, ASSET 2014, RES 2015, RUD 2015, Cergy-Pontoise, Manchester, Warwick and Royal Holloway.
B Spyros Galanis
spyros.galanis@city.ac.uk
1 Department of Economics, City, University of London, London, UK
123
1468 S. Galanis
first, Dynamic Consistency (DC), requires that an action plan is optimal when eval-
uated with the updated preferences of a later period if and only if it is optimal when
evaluated with the preferences of an earlier period. DC ensures that an ex ante optimal
action plan will remain optimal at every period and irrespective of how information is
updated. The second, Consequentialism, requires that conditional preferences do not
depend on past actions, foregone payoffs or unrealized events. These two properties
form the basis of backward induction and dynamic programming.
The Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model is consistent with both DC and
Consequentialism, together with other attractive properties, such as positive value of
information, recursive representation of preferences and Bayesian updating of beliefs.
However, for other preferences this is not true in general. In particular, preferences
which are ambiguity sensitive must either relax DC or Consequentialism (Siniscalchi
2009).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the connection between these properties
in a general environment of convex preferences over monetary acts. We find that, far
from being incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. We
break DC into two parts. Consider two acts f and g which specify the same monetary
payoffs if the complement of event E occurs. The “if” direction of DC specifies that
if the agent weakly prefers f over g ex ante, then he also prefers it when he learns
that E occurred. The “only if” direction requires the converse.
We first show that the “only if” direction of DC is inconsistent with Ellsberg (1961)
but equivalent to positive value of information, meaning that a single agent always
prefers to receive more information to less. Intuitively, an agent who understands
that his preferences will change if he learns an event might not want to receive this
information, as this could lead to choices that he considers suboptimal in the ex ante
stage. Although several authors have previously discussed this connection, to our
knowledge this is the first paper that provides a formal characterization.
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) have criticised the ambiguity aversion literature
on the basis that aversion to information is not normatively appealing. However, we
show that ambiguity averse preferences are consistent with a weaker version of valu-
able information. In particular, we say that information is weakly valuable if (ex ante)
the agent always prefers mixing more information with less information, rather than
receiving less information with certainty. Such an agent recognises that more infor-
mation has at least some value, even if he does not think that more information with
certainty is optimal. We then characterize weakly valuable information with respect to
a weakening of the “only if” direction of DC. These results on the value of information
do not require the full strength of Consequentialism (although they are still true when
Consequentialism is assumed). In particular, we use a weaker axiom, Status Quo Bias.
This property was first proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005),
however it has been studied experimentally at least since Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988), who provided evidence in a study concerning portfolio choices.
Second, we show that a weakening of the “if” direction of DC characterizes the
Bayesian updating of the beliefs revealed by potential trading behavior (and are not
necessarily part of the utility representation of preferences). They are called “subjective
beliefs” by Rigotti et al. (2008) (RSS), who identify them for a wide variety of models
with convex preferences over monetary acts, hence making our approach very general.
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Subjective beliefs have economic content in static environments, as RSS show that
they characterize efficient and full insurance allocations. Moreover, each subjective
belief can be interpreted as state prices ofArrow-Debreu securities, for which the agent
is not willing to trade the act f with which he is endowed.1 If these prices prevail in
the market, we say that f is revealed preferred to all the acts that are affordable for
the agent. Our proposed weakening of the “if” direction of DC specifies that if f is
ex ante revealed preferred (but not necessarily weakly preferred) to another act g then
f is ex post weakly preferred to g. The weakening of the “only if” direction of DC
specifies that if f is ex post weakly preferred to g, then it cannot be that g is ex ante
revealed preferred (but could be strictly preferred) to f .2
Using the results of RSS, who characterise the subjective beliefs for several ambi-
guity averse preference models, we discuss some updating rules. We note that our
domain of preferences, just like in RSS, is acts from states to monetary outcomes, a
special case of Savage (1954). This is the natural domain in order to interpret subjec-
tive beliefs as prices of Arrow-Debreu securities and motivate the weakening of DC
using the notion of revealed preference. However, many decision theoretic models use
the more general domain of acts from states to lotteries over outcomes. We discuss in
Sect. 6 how weak DC extends to this domain.
In a companion paper (Galanis 2021), we show that the economic content of sub-
jective beliefs extends to dynamic and multi-agent environments. First, their Bayesian
updating is the minimum requirement which ensures that there is no speculative
trade, generalising the result of Milgrom and Stokey (1982). Second, if information
is (weakly) valuable for each agent, then public information is (weakly) not valu-
able, generalising the result of Hirshleifer (1971) and Schlee (2001) in competitive
risk-sharing environments without aggregate uncertainty.
1.1 Our approach
We illustrate our approach by analyzing a dynamic Ellsberg’s three-color problem,
taken from Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Hanany and Klibanoff (2007). We show
that Ellsberg preferences, Consequentialism and an axiom we call Conditional Pref-
erence imply that DC and value of information are violated. We then explain our
weakening of DC.
An urn contains 120 balls, 40 of which are known to be black (B), whereas the
remaining 80 are somehow divided between red (R) and yellow (Y). The state space
is S = {B, R,Y }. A bet is an act from S to R, specifying a payoff at each state.
Consider acts f1 = (1, 0, 0), f2 = (0, 1, 0), f3 = (0, 1, 1) and f4 = (1, 0, 1),
where, for example, f1 specifies a payoff of 1 if the state is B and 0 otherwise. The
agent has ex ante preferences  which conform to Ellsberg, hence f1  f2 and
f3  f4.
1 An act can be identified by a convex combination of Arrow-Debreu securities, thus providing a mapping
from states to consumption of a single good.
2 As with DC, the axiom applies only for acts f and g which are identical outside of the event that is
revealed ex post. Formal details are presented in Sect. 2.
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We assume that the agent is endowed with preference relation {B,R} conditional
on learning that event {B, R} has occurred and{Y } conditional on learning that event
{Y } has occurred. This specification implicitly assumesConsequentialism, because the
conditional preference only depends on the updated event and not on other parameters,
such as the act that the agent chose in the previous period or the decision problem he
faced. In the rest of the paper, we relax this assumption, so that conditional preferences
may depend on the event and the act that was chosen in the previous period.
Note that, conditional on {Y }, f1 is identical to f2 and f3 is identical to f4. The
axiomConditional Preference requires that the agent is indifferent between such acts if
he learns that {Y } has occurred, hence f1 ∼{Y } f2 and f3 ∼{Y } f4.3 Similarly, because
conditional on {B, R} f1 is identical with f4 and f2 is identical with f3, Conditional
Preference requires that f1 ∼{B,R} f4 and f2 ∼{B,R} f3.
We first show that these Ellsberg preferences imply that DC is violated and informa-
tion is not valuable. We represent information by a partition  of S. LetA = { f3, f4}
be the set of feasible acts.Without loss of generality, suppose that f4 {B,R} f3.4 First,
suppose that the agent has no information, so his partition is1 = {S}. In other words,
he never learns whether {Y } has occurred or not, so {Y } and {B,R} are irrelevant.
Then, he chooses f3, because f3  f4.
Consider now the more informative partition 2 = {{B, R},Y }, meaning that he
is informed whether Y has occurred or not, before making his choice. If he learns that
{B, R} has occurred, he chooses f4 because f4 {B,R} f3, whereas if he learns {Y },
he again chooses f4 because f3 ∼{Y } f4.
The agent understands that if his partition is 1 he will get f3 in all states, whereas
if his partition is 2 he will get f4. He strictly prefers the former ex ante because
f3  f4. Because 2 is finer than 1, we say that information is not valuable. The
“only if” direction of DC (Axiom 12) specifies that if the agent weakly prefers f4 over
f3 given that he has learned {B, R} and the acts are identical outside of {B, R}, then
he also weakly prefers f4 over f3 before learning whether {B, R} has occurred or not.
This is violated here as we have both f4 {B,R} f3 and f3  f4. Violation of both
Axiom 12 and valuable information is not particular to this example, as Proposition 1
shows that they are equivalent.
The above results show that we cannot weaken the “only if” part of DC without
losing positive value of information. Suppose now that a f4 + (1 − a) f3  f3 for
some a ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the agent recognises that more information has some value,
because he would prefer to mix more with less information, instead of getting less
information for sure.5 When this happens, we say that information is weakly valuable.
3 Several authors call this property Consequentialism, implicitly assuming that the conditional preference
only depends on the realised event. Following Epstein and Schneider (2003), we call this property Condi-
tional Preference and formally define it in Sect. 2 as Axiom 5. We assume it throughout the paper.
4 For the case where f3 {B,R} f4, we can obtain negative value of information using a similar example,
with feasible acts A = { f1, f2}, as Consequentialism implies that f2 {B,R} f1.
5 The interpretation of mixing depends on the range of acts. If the range is monetary outcomes (or more
generally a convex set, a special case of Savage (1954)), then a f4 + (1 − a) f3 provides, at state s, the
monetary outcome a f4(s) + (1 − a) f3(s). If acts are contingent lotteries, a special case of Anscombe and
Aumann (1963), then a f4(s) + (1 − a) f3(s) is a lottery that gives f4(s) with probability a and f3(s)
with probability 1 − a. In the paper the range is monetary outcomes, but we discuss the extension to state
contingent lotteries in Sect. 6.
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Fig. 1 Revealed preference
Proposition 1 characterizes this form of valuable information in terms of Axiom 14,
which is weaker than Axiom 12, the “only if” part of DC.
WeweakenDCby introducing the revealed preference relation, denoted∗.We say
that f is revealed preferred to g if f is weakly preferred to all mixtures a f + (1−a)g,
for a ∈ [0, 1]. This is neither a complete nor a transitive preference relation. In Fig. 1,
there are two states, s1 and s2 and a point denotes an act. The depicted indifference
curve has a kink at f and several supporting hyperplanes, given by the shaded area.
Although f is strictly preferred to g, h and k, it is revealed preferred only to g and h.
Even though f is not revealed preferred to k, convexity of preferences implies that f
is strictly preferred to some convex combination of f and k. This convexity property
is used extensively.
The normals of the hyperplanes that pass from f (normalized to be probability
distributions) are called subjective beliefs at f by Rigotti et al. (2008) and denoted
by π( f ). For convex preferences, each p ∈ π( f ) has the following property: if the
expectation of f given p (denoted Ep f ) is greater or equal to the expectation of
another act g given p, then f is weakly preferred to g. We can interpret p as a price
vector, such that p(s) is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays 1 if state s
occurs and 0 otherwise. Then, the property says that if the agent’s endowment is f ,
he would have zero net demand at each price vector p ∈ π( f ). Hence, we say that f
is revealed preferred to g because the agent could afford g given prices p but chose
his endowment, f .
Suppose that acts f and g are identical in terms of what they prescribe if event E
does not occur. Then, the “if” part of DC is weakened by requiring that if f is revealed
preferred (but not necessarilyweakly preferred) to g ex ante, then f isweakly preferred
to g conditional on E . The “only if” part of DC is weakened by requiring that if f
is weakly preferred to g conditional on E , then g cannot be revealed preferred (but
could be strictly preferred) to f ex ante.
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In this section, we have assumed Consequentialism. In the rest of the paper we relax
this, so that conditional preferences can depend both on the event and on the act that
was chosen in the ex ante stage.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, whereas Sect. 3
formalises the notions of (weak) valuable information and characterizes them with
respect to the “only if” part of (weak) DC. In Sect. 4, we characterize the “if” part of
weak DCwith respect to Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs. We examine various
updating rules in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we discuss the related literature and provide a
detailed comparison with Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Hanany and Klibanoff (2007,




Fix a finite set of payoff relevant states S, with typical element s. The set of conse-
quences is R+, interpreted as monetary payoffs. Let F = RS+ be the set of acts, with
the natural topology. An act f ∈ F maps each state s to a monetary payoff. Given
x ∈ R+, let x ∈ F be the constant act with payoff x at each state s. Let X be the set
of constant acts. An act f is strictly positive if f (s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. Let F+ be the
set of strictly positive acts.
For any two acts f , g ∈ F and event E ⊆ S, we denote by f Eg the act h such that
h(s) = f (s) if s ∈ E and h(s) = g(s) if s /∈ E . Define f ≥E g if f (s) ≥ g(s) for all
s ∈ E , with strict inequality for some s ∈ E . Equality f =E g and strict inequality
are similarly defined. Let Ec be the complement of E with respect to S.
Given events E, F ⊆ S and probability measure p ∈ E , where F ⊆ E and
p(F) > 0, denote by pF ∈ F the measure obtained through Bayesian conditioning
of p on F . Formally, for any event G ⊆ S, pF (G) = p(G∩F)p(F) . We write Ep f :=∑
s∈E
p(s) f (s) for the expectation of f given p.
Let E be a collection of nonempty events E ⊆ S which contains S. The deci-
sion maker is endowed with a collection of conditional preference relations, {E,h
}E∈E,h∈F , one for each event E ∈ E and each act h ∈ F . The interpretation is that
in a previous period the agent had chosen act h and in the current period he learns
that event E has occurred. His updated preference relation is then E,h . The ex ante
preference relation S,h does not depend on the act h and is denoted by .
A partition of S is a collection of mutually disjoint events, whose union is S. It is
finer than another partition ′ if, for each E ′ ∈ ′, there exists E ∈  with E ⊆ E ′.
We then say that ′ is coarser than .
123
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2.2 Revealed preference
Given preference relationE,h , we say that act f is revealed preferred to act g, written
f ∗E,h g, if f E,h ag + (1 − a) f for all a ∈ [0, 1], so that f is weakly preferred
to all convex combinations of f and g. Preference relation ∗E,h is neither transitive
nor complete.
The interpretation of f ∗E,h g is that f is weakly preferred to g under E,h and g
is inside a “budget set”, which is constructed given f as the agent’s endowment and
some prices for the Arrow-Debreu securities, one for each state. If these prices were
to prevail and the agent chose f , it would be revealed that the agent prefers f over
g. Consider Fig. 1. The indifference curve has a kink on act f and the two straight
lines which define the shaded area are some of its supporting hyperplanes. Each such
line defines a budget set, where f is affordable. Any act that is within this budget set,
like g, is affordable but f is weakly preferred to g, hence we say that f is revealed
preferred to g. On the contrary, although f is strictly preferred to k, it is not revealed
preferred to it, because it is outside any of these budget sets.
2.3 Convex preferences
Weconsider the following axioms on preferences {E,h}E∈E,h∈F , for all events E ∈ E
and acts h ∈ F .
Axiom 1 (Preference). E,h is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all f ∈ F , the sets {g ∈ F : g E,h f } and {g ∈ F :
f E,h g} are closed.
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity). For all f , g ∈ F , if f >E g then f E,h g.
Axiom 4 (Convexity). For all f ∈ F , the set {g ∈ F |g E,h f } is convex.
These four axioms are standard and imply that each E,h is represented by a
continuous, increasing and quasiconcave function UE,h : F → R. The next axiom,
which we require throughout the paper, specifies that if the agent knows that event E
has occurred, his preferences depend only on what acts specify inside E .
Axiom 5 (Conditional Preference) For all f , g ∈ F , if f =E g then f ∼E,h g.
We say that preferences {E }E∈E,h∈F are convex if they satisfy Axioms 1 through
5.
Axiom 6 (Strict Convexity). For all f =E g and α ∈ (0, 1), if f E,h g, then
α f + (1 − α)g E,h g.
The following axiom, No Flat Kinks, is weaker than Strict Convexity and specifies
that if g is strictly preferred to f , then it is not the case that g is indifferent to all
convex combinations of f and g for a closed interval of weights. We use this axiom
in order to show the equivalence of weakly valuable information and one direction




Axiom 7 (No Flat Kinks) If g E,h f then there does not exist a ∈ (0, 1] such that
a f + (1 − a)g ∼E,h g for all a ∈ [0, a].
An event F ⊆ E is non E,h-null if g(s) > g′(s) for all s ∈ F implies gF f E,h
g′F f , for all acts g, g′, f . Hanany and Klibanoff (2007, 2009) restrict attention to
non-null events.6 However, we impose a weaker definition of non-nullity, which is
motivated by the property that all subjective beliefs assign positive probability to not
weakly null events, as we show in Lemma 2. Event F is weakly E,h-null if there
exists act g such that, for all acts g′, f , gF f E,h g′F f . Because for every act f
there exists another act g such that g(s) > f (s) for all s ∈ F , we have that if F is
non-null then it is also not weakly null. The following axiom requires that all events
in E are not weakly null.
Axiom 8 (Weak Full Support). For all events E, F ∈ E , where F ⊆ E, F is not weakly
E,h-null.
2.4 Consequentialism
Consequentialism requires that the agent’s preferences depend only on the received
information and not on the act that was chosen in the previous period.7
Axiom 9 (Consequentialism) For all f , g ∈ F and events E ∈ E , E, f =E,g.
Aweakening of Axiom 9 has been proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005), Sagi (2006) and Ortoleva (2010), where preference relation E,h depends
on a “status quo” act (or frame) h. It specifies that if the agent ever prefers f over g
(given some status quo h), then he would also prefer it if the status quo was f . In other
words, the status quo exerts attraction towards itself.
Axiom 10 (Status Quo Bias) For all f , g, h ∈ F and events E ∈ E , if f E,h g then
f E, f g.
As pointed by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Status Quo Bias is documented not only
by experimental studies but also by empirical work in actual markets. For instance,
Madrian and Shea (2001) examined how the default choice influenced participation
in 401(k) saving plans, whereas Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) identified Status
Quo Bias experimentally, in a study concerning portfolio choices.
2.5 Dynamic consistency
DC provides restrictions on how two acts, which are identical outside of the condi-
tioning event E , should be compared before and after E is known to have occurred.
We break DC into two Axioms and adopt the names proposed by Ghirardato (2002).
6 In their setting, F is non E,h -null if g(s) E,h g′(s) for all s ∈ F implies gF f E,h g′F f , for all
acts g, g′, f .
7 Some papers refer to Consequentialism as the conjunction of Axioms 5 and 9.
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Axiom 11 (Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f , g ∈ F and events E ∈ E ,
if f  g and f =Ec g then f E, f g.
Suppose that f and g specify the same payoff at each state not belonging to event
E and that f is weakly preferred to g ex ante. Consistency of Implementation says
that if the agent has chosen f ex ante and he is informed that event E has occurred (so
that his preferences are E, f ), then in the interim stage f is still weakly preferred to
g. The next axiom is the converse. If f is weakly preferred to g in the interim stage,
given event E and preferences E, f , then f is weakly preferred to g in the ex ante
stage.
Axiom 12 (Information is Valuable) For all acts f , g ∈ F and events E ∈ E , if
f E, f g and f =Ec g then f  g.
2.6 Weak dynamic consistency
Using our notion of revealed preference, we provide a weakening of DC. Axiom 11
(Consistency of Implementation) is weakened by requiring that if ex ante f is revealed
preferred (but not necessarily weakly preferred) to g, then f is weakly preferred to g,
conditional on E . We also require that f is a strictly positive act.
Axiom 13 (Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F and
events E ∈ E , if f ∗ g and f =Ec g then f E, f g.
Suppose that there are three states {s1, s2, s3}, the graph in Fig. 1 depicts acts that are
identical given s3 but the indifference curve represents the ex ante preference relation
, where S = {s1, s2, s3}.8 Act f is strictly preferred to g, h and k according to 
but it is revealed preferred only to g and h. Hence, Axiom 13 requires that, given
E = {s1, s2}, f is weakly preferred to g and h but not k. Proposition 2 shows that
Axiom 13 characterizes Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
The other direction of DC, Axiom 12 (Information is Valuable), is weakened in a
similar manner. Axiom 14 requires that if f is weakly preferred to g conditional on
E and f but ex ante strictly preferred to f , then g is not revealed preferred to f .
Axiom 14 (Weak Information is Valuable) For all acts f ∈ F , g ∈ F+ and events
E ∈ E , if f E, f g, f =Ec g and g  f then g ∗ f .
That is, unlike Axiom 12 (Information is Valuable), Axiom 14 allows for a prefer-
ence reversal, from f E, f g to g  f , but not so severe that we also have g ∗ f .
In the previous example, if k E,k f and k =Ec f , then Axiom 14 requires that
f ∗ k, so that k lies strictly above the shaded area. This means that Axiom 14 allows
for f  k, as is shown in Fig. 1, unlike Axiom 12 (Information is Valuable) which
requires that k  f and therefore is stronger for convex preferences. Proposition 1
shows that Axiom 14 is equivalent to weakly valuable information.
What is the connection between the two parts of DC and weak DC? Under Strict
Convexity and Status Quo Bias, (Weak) Information is Valuable implies (Weak) Con-
sistency of Implementation. If we strengthen Status Quo Bias to Consequentialism,
then the converse is also true.
8 Axiom 13 has content if there are at least three states.
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Lemma 1 Suppose strictly convex preferences {E,h}E∈E,h∈F satisfy StatusQuoBias.
Then, (Weak) Value of Information implies (Weak) Consistency of Implementation.
Under Consequentialism, the converse is also true.
3 Valuable information
Several papers show with examples that failure of DC implies that information is not
always valuable, under various settings (e.g. Wakker (1988), Epstein and Le Breton
(1993)). In this section, we provide a formal treatment of this result and show that the
converse is also true. In particular, we define information to be valuable if an agent
always ex ante prefers having a finer than a coarser partition, given that he will choose
an action in the interim stage, when a partition cell is revealed to him. We show that
valuable information characterises the second part of DC (Axiom 12).9
However, even if the agent does not think that more information is always valuable,
he may still recognise that it has some value. If the agent prefers mixing, for some
a ∈ (0, 1], between receiving the finer and the coarser partition, over receiving the
coarser partition with certainty, we say that information is weakly valuable and show
that it characterizes Axiom 14 (Weak Information is Valuable), which is the second
part of weak DC.
In order to define (weakly) valuable information, we adapt the framework of
Geanakoplos (1989), which assumed expected utility, to the present setting. There
are two periods, 0 and 1. For simplicity, initially assume Axiom 9 (Consequential-
ism). An agent faces some uncertainty in period 0, represented by ex ante preferences
 and a finite state space S. His decision problem consists of a feasible set of acts,A,
and a partition  = {E1, . . . , En} of S. The agent expects that, in period 1, he will be
informed that a particular cell E ∈  of his partition has occurred and will choose an
“interim” act fE ∈ A, which is optimal according to his conditional preferences E .
By choosing an optimal interim act fE for each partition cell E ∈ , he can generate
an “ex-ante” optimal act h such that h =E fE , for each E ∈ . In other words, the
ex ante optimal act h agrees with the interim acts fE1 , . . . fEn , conditional on each
element of , and fE E g for all g ∈ A.
Since we want to characterise valuable information also in the case where Conse-
quentialism is not assumed, we adjust slightly the definition of ex ante optimality. In
particular,we say that the ex ante optimal acth agreeswith the interimacts fE1 , . . . fEn ,
conditional on each element of , and fE E,h g for all g ∈ A.
The ex ante optimal act may not be unique, because there may be many interim
optimal acts fE , f ′E ∈ A given E . We therefore require, in order to say that partition
 is “more valuable” than partition ′ given A, that for every ex ante optimal act
h
′
for ′ there is an ex ante optimal act h for  such that h  h′ . It is weakly
more valuable if ah + (1 − a)h′  h′ , for some a ∈ (0, 1]. We then say that
information is (weakly) valuable if, for all A, whenever  is finer than ′ it is also
(weakly) more valuable.
9 We are not aware of such a characterization previously shown in the literature.
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We now provide the formal treatment. Fix a collection of conditional preference
relations {E,h}E∈E,h∈F , where  is the preference relation in period 0. A decision
problem D = {,A} consists of a partition  ⊆ E of S representing the information
in period 1 and a set of available acts A ⊆ F .
An act f ∈ F is feasible ex ante for decision problem D if for each E ∈  there
exists g ∈ A such that f =E g, so that they provide the same payoffs given event E .
Let FD be the set of acts which are feasible ex ante with respect to decision problem
D. Note that A ⊆ FD , whereas if  = {S} is the trivial partition, then A = FD .
An act f ∈ FD which is feasible ex ante is optimal if, conditional on each element
E ∈  of the partition and f , it is weakly preferred to any act g ∈ A.
Definition 1 Act f ∈ FD is optimal for decision problem D = {,A} if for all
E ∈ , f E, f g for all g ∈ A.
Note that even if optimal f ∈ FD does not belong to A, Axiom 5 (Conditional
Preference) and ex ante feasibility of f imply that there exists g ∈ Awith f =E g and
f ∼E, f g, hence it is as if the agent picks f at each cell E . We compare two decision
problems that differ only in terms of how they partition S, by comparing the optimal
acts they generate, according to the ex ante preference relation . Decision problem
D1 is more valuable thanD2 if, for every optimal act forD2 there exists an optimal act
for D1 that the agent weakly prefers. It is weakly more valuable if he weakly prefers
a convex combination of the two.
Definition 2 Decision problemD1 = {1,A} is more valuable than decision problem
D2 = {2,A} if, whenever act f ∈ FD1 is optimal forD1 and act g ∈ FD2 is optimal
for D2, we have f  g. It is weakly more valuable if a f + (1 − a)g  g for some
a ∈ (0, 1].
Recall that partition1 is finer than partition2 if for every element E2 ∈ 2, there
exists E1 ∈ 1 with E1 ⊆ E2. Information is (weakly) valuable for {E,h}E∈E,h∈F if
a decision problem generated by a finer partition is always (weakly) more valuable.10
Definition 3 Information is (weakly) valuable for {E,h}E∈E,h∈F if for all A ⊆ F
(F+), whenever partition 1 is finer than partition 2, decision problem D1 =
{1,A} is (weakly) more valuable than decision problem D2 = {2,A}.
We now show that valuable information is equivalent to Axiom 12 (Information is
Valuable), whereas under No Flat Kinks weakly valuable information is equivalent to
Axiom 14 (Weak Information is Valuable). Interestingly, we do not need to assume
Consequentialism, only Status Quo Bias, which is weaker.
Proposition 1 Suppose Status Quo Bias is satisfied. Then, information is valuable
for convex preferences {E,h}E∈E,h∈F if and only if Axiom Information is Valuable
is satisfied. Axiom Weak Information is Valuable implies that information is weakly
valuable. The converse is true under No Flat Kinks.
10 The definition of weakly valuable information is restricted to feasible sets A ⊆ F+ consisting of
strictly positive acts. This simplifies the analysis (as in Hanany and Klibanoff (2009)), because it avoids the
multiplicity of supporting hyperplanes at the boundary.
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An interesting question is whether information is always valuable when the
partitions contain only unambiguous events. The answer is no. We provide a counter-
examplewithMEUpreferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), adopting the following
definition of an unambiguous event, from Nehring (1999) and Ghirardato et al.
(2004).11 An event E is unambiguous given a set of priors C if for all p, q ∈ C ,
p(E) = q(E).
Consider a state space with 4 states, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The agent has MEU




u( f (s)), where u(x) = x . The
agent’s set of priors C is the convex hull of probabilities (0.4, 0.1, 0.25, 0.25) and
(0.1, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2). When the agent is informed that event E ∈  occurred, he forms
beliefs CE , using prior-by-prior updating.
We compare two partitions. Partition 1 contains no information, so 1 = {S},
whereas partition 2 is2 = {{s1, s2}, {s3, s4}}. The three events in these two partitions,
{S}, {s1, s2}, {s3, s4}, are unambiguous, because all p ∈ C assign the same probability.
There are two acts, f = (1, 2,−2, 3) and g = (1, 2, 1,−1). Let E = {s3, s4}. First,
note that U ( f ) = 0.85 and U (g) = 0.6. If event E occurs, prior-by-prior updating
implies that CE is the convex hull of probabilities (0.5, 0.5) and (0.6, 0.4). We then
have that UE ( f ) = UE (g) = 0. This violates the Axiom Value of Information,
because g E f , f =Ec g but f  g. In other words, even though all events in
the two partitions are unambiguous, the agent with a partition 1 would prefer not to
obtain the more informative 2 ex ante, because the former would yield f , whereas
with the latter he would choose g.
4 Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs
RSS define the subjective beliefs at an act f and preference relation E,h to be the
set of all normals (normalized to be probabilities) of the supporting hyperplanes of f ,
πE,h( f ) = {p ∈ S : Epg ≥ Ep f for all g E,h f }.
In Fig. 1, the indifference curve at f has a kink. All the supporting hyperplanes at f
are in the shaded area. Set πE,h( f ) contains their (normalized) normals.
RSS provide two alternative definitions for subjective beliefs and show that all
three coincide for strictly positive acts. First, suppose that the agent’s endowment is
act f and we interpret a probability measure as a set of prices, one for each Arrow-
Debreu security which pays 1 in a particular state and 0 otherwise. Given preference
relation E,h , the subjective beliefs revealed by unwillingness to trade at f contain
the measures (prices) for which the agent would be unwilling to trade his endowment,
πuE,h( f ) = {p ∈ S : f E,h g for all g such that Epg = Ep f }.
11 See also Amarante and Filiz (2007). In the case of Choquet expected utility preferences, Dominiak and
Lefort (2011) study the connection between DC and unambiguous events , whereas Asano and Kojima
(2019) axiomatize the Dempster-Shafer and naive Bayes’ rules.
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Second, let P be a set of measures (prices) such that whenever another act k is
unaffordable for every p ∈ P , then there exists a mixture of k with endowment f
that the agent would strictly prefer to his endowment. In Fig. 1, there exist some
points on the convex combination between f and k that are strictly preferred to f . The
smallest such P of measures contains the subjective beliefs revealed by willingness
to trade at f . Formally, let PE,h( f ) denote the collection of all compact, convex sets
P ⊆ S such that if Epg > Ep f for all p ∈ P , then εg + (1 − ε) f E,h f for
sufficiently small ε > 0. Then, the subjective beliefs revealed by willingness to trade
at f are denoted by πwE,h( f ) =
⋂PE,h( f ). RSS show that for strictly positive acts
f , πE,h( f ) = πuE,h( f ) = πwE,h( f ).
We next define Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs. Note that even though we
require that every subjective belief in π( f ) is updated when E occurs, we allow for
the possibility that more subjective beliefs are included given E .
Definition 4 The subjective beliefs of {E,h}E∈E,h∈F are updated using Bayes’ rule
if, for all E ∈ E and all f ∈ F+, if p ∈ π( f ) and p(E) > 0 then pE ∈ πE, f ( f ).
A convenient and often assumed property of dynamic models with ambiguity is
mutual absolute continuity of the priors used to represent preferences. It specifies that
all priors put positive probability on the same events. This facilitates the Bayesian
updating of all the priors when new information arrives, without worrying how to
update priors that assign zero probability on the event. Epstein and Marinacci (2007)
characterize mutual absolute continuity in the multiple priors model, using a condition
introduced by Kreps (1979). In the following lemma we characterize mutual absolute
continuity of the subjective beliefs, using the notion of a weakly null event.
Lemma 2 If event F ⊆ E ∈ E is not weakly E,h-null then p ∈ πuE,h( f ) implies
p(F) > 0, for all acts f ∈ F . Conversely, if, for all acts f ∈ F , p ∈ πwE,h( f ) implies
p(F) > 0, then F is not weakly E,h-null.
Using this lemma, Weak Full Support, which is implied by Strong Monotonicity,
ensures that all subjective beliefs p ∈ πuE,h( f ) put positive probability at each event
F ∈ E , where F ⊆ E .
We now show that Weak Consistency of Implementation (Axiom 13), which is
weaker than the second part of DC (Axiom 11), is equivalent to Bayesian updating of
subjective beliefs. For the “only if” direction we also need Weak Full Support, which
ensures that all subjective beliefs put positive probability on each conditioning event.
Proposition 2 Suppose that convex preferences {E,h}E∈E,h∈F satisfyWeak Full Sup-
port. Then, subjective beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule if and only if Weak
Consistency of Implementation is satisfied.
5 Updating rules
In this section we discuss updating rules using the results of RSS, who characterise
the subjective beliefs for various preference models with ambiguity aversion. We
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propose ruleswhich satisfyBayesian updating of subjective beliefs and thereforeWeak
Consistency of Implementation. As with the rest of the paper and RSS, the domain
of preferences is acts from states to monetary outcomes. In Sect. 6, we discuss how
Weak Consistency of Implementation can be extended to a domain of state contingent
lotteries. We restrict attention to strictly positive acts f , so that πh( f ) = πuh ( f ) =
πwh ( f ). We also assume that whenever u is defined, it is concave, increasing and
continuously differentiable.
5.1 Variational preferences
Maccheroni et al. (2006a) axiomatize the variational preferences model, which con-
tains as special cases the MEUmodel of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the multiplier
preferences model of Hansen and Sargent (2001) and the mean-variance preferences
of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958). The representation of ex ante preferences is
U ( f ) = min
p∈S
{∫
u( f )dp + c(p)
}
,
where c : S → [0,∞] is a lower semicontinuous convex function, called ambiguity
index, with min
p∈Sc(p) = 0 and u is increasing, concave and differentiable. For sim-
plicity, we assume that if c(p) = +∞, then p(E) > 0 for all E ∈ E . RSS show that
such preferences are convex.
Given event E ∈ E , act h ∈ F and preference relation E,h , the agent’s utility at f
is UE,h( f ) = min
p∈E
{∫
u( f )dp + cE,h(p)
}
, where cE,h is the conditional ambiguity
index with min
p∈EcE,h(p) = 0. Let ME,h( f ) = argminp∈E
{∫
u( f )dp + cE,h(p)
}
be the
set of minimizing priors realising the utility of f .
We define an updating rule by a tuple {D f , nE, f , kE, f , cE, f }, for each event E ∈ E
and act f . First, D f ⊆ S is a convex set such that M( f ) ⊆ D f .12 Let D fE be the
prior by prior updating of D f . Second, function nE, f : D fE → Smaps each p ∈ D fE
to an unconditional q ∈ S. Third, let
kE, f = min
q∈D fE
{∫





The ambiguity index cE, f : E → [0,+∞] is defined as
cE, f (p) =
∫
u( f )dnE, f (p) + c(nE, f (p)) −
∫
u( f )dp − kE, f , (1)
if p ∈ D fE , otherwise cE, f (p) = +∞. Subtracting kE, f ensures that cE, f (p) ∈[0,+∞] and cE, f (p) = 0 for some p. In order to ensure that cE, f is convex, contin-
uous and subjective beliefs are updated, we consider two specific functions nE, f .
12 Note that M( f ) is convex.
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For the first updating rule, fix measure r ∈ M( f ) with r(E) > 0 and let D f such
that p ∈ D f implies c(p) = +∞.13 Set nE, f (p) = r for all p ∈ D fE .
The second rule applies only in the case where M( f ) = {r} is a singleton and
r(E) > 0. Set D f = S and let nE, f (p) = p ⊗E r for all p ∈ E , where
p ⊗E r ∈ S is such that p ⊗E r(F) = r(E)p(F) + r(F ∩ Ec) for all events
F . Then, in p ⊗E r the choice of p determines all probabilities given E whereas r
determines all other probabilities.
We next show that these two rules generate variational preferences that satisfy
Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Weak Consistency of Implementation
(Axiom 13), although DC (Axioms 11 and 12) is violated in general. Interestingly, for
the first rule, if we set D f = D to be the set of all measures with c(p) = +∞, for all
f ∈ F , so that it is independent of f , then Consistency of Implementation (Axiom 11)
is satisfied. If D f = M( f ) for all f ∈ F , then Information is Valuable (Axiom 12) is
satisfied. Hence, the largest possible set of prior by prior updating satisfies Consistency
of Implementation, whereas the smallest possible set satisfies Information is Valuable.
Any set which is in between, satisfies Weak Consistency of Implementation.
Lemma 3 Suppose that  is a variational preference. Then, both updating rules
described above generate variational preferences {E, f }E∈E, f ∈F that satisfy
Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Weak Consistency of Implementation.
Moreover, in the first rule if D f = D for all f ∈ F and c(p) = +∞ implies p ∈ D,
then Consistency of Implementation is satisfied. If D f = M( f ) for all f ∈ F , then
Axiom Information is Valuable is satisfied. However, in general both rules violate
Consistency of Implementation and Information is Valuable.
5.2 Confidence preferences
Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) axiomatize a class of preferences where ambiguity is
measured by a confidence function φ : S → [0, 1], with φ(p) = 1 meaning full
confidence in p. The set of full confidence measures is nonempty and φ is upper
semicontinuous and quasiconcave. Preferences are represented by





where La = {q ∈ S : φ(q) ≥ a} is a set of measures with confidence of at least






for each f ∈ F . For simplicity, we
assume that if p ∈ La then p(E) > 0 for all E ∈ E . Hence, Weak Full Support
(Axiom 8) is satisfied.
Consider the following updating rule. Fix measure r ∈ M(h) with r(E) > 0 and
convex set Dh such that M(h) ⊆ Dh ⊆ La . Let DhE be the prior by prior updating of















if p ∈ DE , otherwise φE,h(p) = 0. Setting aE,h = min
p∈DE
φE,h(p), we have that




We now show that this updating rule satisfiesWeak Consistency of Implementation.
As with the first updating rule on variational preferences, the largest possible prior by
prior updating set additionally satisfies Consistency of Implementation, whereas the
smallest satisfies Information is Valuable. However, if Dh is a strict subset of La , then
Consistency of Implementation may be violated.
Lemma 4 Suppose that is a confidence preference. Then, the updating rule described
above generates confidence preferences {E,h}E∈E,h∈F that satisfy Bayesian updat-
ing of subjective beliefs and Weak Consistency of Implementation. Moreover, if
D f = La for all f ∈ F , then Consistency of Implementation is satisfied. If
D f = M( f ) for all f ∈ F , then Information is Valuable is satisfied. If Dh is a
strict subset of La, then Consistency of Implementation may be violated.
6 Discussion
Before discussing the literature, we compare our approach with Ghirardato et al.
(2004) andHanany andKlibanoff (2007, 2009), which are closely related. One notable
difference is that they use the larger domain of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). That
is, preferences are over acts f : S → X , where X is the set of simple lotteries over
a set of consequences Z . In order to compare our approach with theirs, we assume
that Z = R+. Let FAA be the set of such acts. Our definition of revealed preference
in the larger domain FAA is extended as follows. For all f , g ∈ FAA, f ∗AA g if
f  ag + (1 − a) f for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the mixed act ag + (1 − a) f has a
different interpretation in this section. At state s, it gives lottery g(s) with probability
a and lottery f (s) with probability 1− a. In the previous sections of the paper, where
the restricted domain F applies, at state s act g  a f + (1 − a) f pays the expected
payoff ag(s) + (1 − a) f (s) ∈ Z for sure.
6.1 Unambiguous preferences
Ghirardato et al. (2004) define f to be unambiguously preferred to g, written f ∗GMM
g, if mixing with any other act h does not reverse preferences: α f + (1 − α)h 
αg + (1 − α)h for all acts f , g, h ∈ FAA and α ∈ (0, 1]. Our extended notion of
revealed preference (given Consequentialism) requires mixing only with h = f , so
that f ∗AA g if f  ag + (1 − a) f for all f , g,∈ FAA and a ∈ [0, 1], hence it is
weaker. That is, f ∗GMM g implies f ∗AA g for all f , g ∈ FAA.
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Although the representation Ghirardato et al. (2004) is in a setting which satisfies
the Certainty Independence Axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2011) show that it holds more generally for uncertainty averse preferences.
In particular, they show that f ∗GMM g if and only if
∫
u( f )dp ≥ ∫ u(g)dp
for all p ∈ C , where C = cl(co( ⋃
f ∈F
πu0 ( f ))) and π
u
0 ( f ) = {p ∈ S : f 
g for all g such that Epu( f ) ≥ Epu(g)} is the set of subjective beliefs evaluated at
u( f ), rather than at f , as is πu( f ).
Ghirardato et al. (2008) provide a dynamic version of Ghirardato et al. (2004),
assuming Conditional Preference, Consequentialism and DC on ∗GMM , so that
f ∗GMM,E g if and only if f ∗GMM g, for all acts f , g with f =Ec g. They
show that Bayesian updating of all beliefs in C is equivalent to ∗GMM satisfying DC.
6.2 Uncertainty averse preferences
Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) relax Consequentialism, allowing for preferences con-
ditional on an event to also depend on the feasible set B of acts and on the act that was
chosen ex ante. They show in the MEU model that a weakening of DC is equivalent
to Bayesian updating of a subset of the unconditional beliefs. Moreover, their model
allows for both Ellsberg type behavior and non-reversal of preferences when informa-
tion is revealed, hence DC is satisfied. Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) generalise their
approach to models that satisfy the uncertainty aversion axiom Schmeidler (1989),
showing that their Dynamic Consistency Axiom is equivalent to having at least one
measure which supports both the conditional indifference curve at the chosen act and
its conditional optimality.
To explain their approach, let Q be the set of all quadruples (, E, f , B), where
non-null E is the conditioning event and act f ∈ FAA is optimally chosen from a
convex feasible set B ∈ B ( f  g for all g ∈ B), before the realization of E , where B
is the set of all convex and compact sets. LetD ⊆ Q be a domain if (, E, f , B) ∈ D
implies (, E, f ′, B ′) ∈ D for each f ′, B ′ such that (, E, f ′, B ′) ∈ Q and u ◦ f ′ is
the unique maximizer of V (which represents preferences) over u ◦ B ′. Their Dynamic
Consistency axiom is the following.
Axiom 15 (DCHK )For any (, E, f , B) ∈ D, if g ∈ B with f =Ec g, then f E, f ,B
g.
The main difference of their approach from ours is that preferences depend not
only on the conditioning event E and act f , but also on the feasible set B. The current
paper additionally imposes that E, f ,B=E, f ,B′ for all convex feasible sets B and
B ′. To state the difference formally, we extend Weak Consistency of Implementation
(Axiom 13) to the bigger FAA domain.14
Axiom 16 (WCOIAA) For all acts f , g ∈ FAA and events E ∈ E , if f ∗AA g and
f =Ec g then f E, f g.
14 For simplicity, we assume that all acts in FAA are strictly positive in utility space (the interior acts in
Hanany and Klibanoff (2009)).
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We now show that the two axioms are equivalent, given that conditional preferences
do not depend on the feasible set B.
Lemma 5 Suppose E, f ,B=E, f ,B′ for all convex feasible sets B and B ′. Then,
DCHK is equivalent to WCOIAA.
In general, however, whenever E, f ,B =E, f ,B′ is allowed, WCOIAA is stronger
than DCHK , as it requires that F, f ,B=F, f ,B′ for all B, B ′. The characterizations
in Hanany and Klibanoff (2007, 2009) are provided for the general case, except for
the smooth ambiguity model, where there is a unique subjective belief at each f and
preferences do not depend on B.
We now show that, in the case of variational preferences where subjective beliefs
are not unique andF, f ,B =F, f ,B′ , a rule proposed byHanany andKlibanoff (2009)
which satisfies DCHK implies that at least one subjective belief is updated, but not
all. This means that Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Weak Consistency of
Implementation fail.
Fix r ∈ M( f )∩ QE, f ,B , where QE, f ,B is the set of measures which, when condi-
tioned on E , support the conditional optimality of f in B.15 The ambiguity index of
their proposed updating rule is
cE, f ,B(p) = 1
r(E)
[





where p ⊗E r ∈ S is such that p ⊗E r(F) = r(E)p(F) + r(F ∩ Ec) for all events
F . Note that for all p ∈ E , ∫ u( f )dp + cE, f ,B(p) ≥
∫
u( f )drE + cE, f ,B(rE )
if and only if r(E)
∫
u( f )dp + c(p ⊗E r) ≥ r(E) ∫ u( f )drE + c(r), which is true
because
∫
u( f )dp ⊗E r = r(E) ∫ u( f )dp + ∫Ec u( f )dr and r ∈ M( f ). Using the
proof of Lemma 8, we can show that the subjective belief generated by r is updated.
If, however, q ∈ M( f ) and q = r , then it is not necessarily the case that∫
u( f )dp + cE, f ,B(p) ≥
∫
u( f )dqE + cE, f ,B(qE ) for all p ∈ E , which means
that the subjective belief generated by q is not updated. The reason is that we need
r(E)
∫
u( f )dp + c(p ⊗E r) ≥ r(E) ∫ u( f )dqE + c(qE ⊗E r), which is equiva-
lent to
∫
u( f )dp ⊗E r + c(p ⊗E r) ≥ ∫ u( f )dqE ⊗E r + c(qE ⊗E r), however if
qE ⊗E r /∈ M( f ) this may not be true. Hence, not all subjective beliefs are updated
and Axiom 13 is violated.
To provide a numerical example, consider the setting of Sect. 1.1 withMEU ex ante
preferences, u(x) = x and C being the convex hull of the following three measures:
p1 = (0.24, 0.33, 0.43), p2 = (0.34, 0.2, 0.46) and p3 = (0.21, 0.68, 0.11). Let f =
x ∈ R be a constant act and note thatM( f ) = C . Pick r = p1 and define feasible set B
such that f ∈ B ifEr x ≥ Er f . Then, p1 ∈ M( f )∩QE, f ,B . If we pick p1 to generate
cE,x,B , using (3), then we have that p2E ⊗E p1 = {0.3589, 0.2111, 0.4300} /∈ C . This
means that cE,x,B(p2E ) = +∞ and p2E /∈ ME,x (x), hence not all subjective beliefs
are updated.
Finally, we show that in the smooth ambiguity model (Maccheroni et al. 2006a),
where subjective beliefs are unique at each f , Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) propose
15 The formal definition of QE, f ,B is in Hanany and Klibanoff (2009).
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a rule which satisfies Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs. An act f is weakly
preferred to g if and only if Eμφ(Epu ◦ f ) ≥ Eμφ(Epu ◦ g), where φ : R → R
is an increasing transformation called the ambiguity attitude and μ is a subjective
probability over the set of probability measures p ∈ S that the agent considers
relevant for his problem. For simplicity, we assume that μ has finite support and that
u and φ are concave, increasing and differentiable, so that preferences are convex. We
also assume Axiom 8, which implies that for each E ∈ p, there exists p ∈ supp(μ)
with p(E) > 0.
Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) propose the smooth rule, which specifies that
μE, f (p) =
μ(p)p(E)
φ′(Ep(u◦ f ))




φ′(E p̂(u◦ f ))
φ′(E p̂E (u◦ f ))
if p(E) > 0 and 0 otherwise.
The smooth rule satisfies the following condition, which Hanany and Klibanoff
(2009) show that it characterizes DCHK :
EμE, f [φ′(EpE u ◦ f )pE (s)]
EμE, f [φ′(EpE u ◦ f )]
= Eμ[φ
′(Epu ◦ f )p(s)]
Eμ[φ′(Epu ◦ f )p(E)] (4)
for all f ∈ F , s ∈ E and p ∈ supp(μ) with p(E) > 0.16 We show that (4) satisfies
Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
Lemma 6 There is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs for any rule satisfying (4).
6.3 Related literature
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) study general convex preferences which satisfy the
uncertainty aversion axiom of Schmeidler (1989). Epstein and Schneider (2003),Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006b) and Klibanoff et al. (2009) use DC in order to provide recursive
representations for the static models of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Maccheroni
et al. (2006a) and Klibanoff et al. (2005), respectively. Several other papers employ
DC, such as Eichberger and Kelsey (1996), Eichberger et al. (2005, 2016), Takashi
(2005) Sarin and Wakker (1998), Wang (2003), Hayashi and Miao (2011) and Ver-
gopoulos (2011).
Siniscalchi (2011) drops DC completely and replaces it with Consistent Planning,
which specifies that the agent adjusts his actions today in order to restrict his future
self’s choices, because he recognises that his preferences will change tomorrow. This
approach accommodates Ellsberg but information is not valuable, unless the agent can
exogenously commit.
Bayesian updating of priors is suggested or characterized by Jaffray (1992, 1994),
Fagin andHalpern (1991),Wasserman andKadane (1990),Walley (1991), Epstein and
16 Note that we state the condition on F , whereas Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) state it on FAA.
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Schneider (2003), Sarin and Wakker (1998), Pires (2002), Siniscalchi (2001), Wang
(2003) and Faro and Lefort (2019). Ghirardato et al. (2008) characterize the Bayesian
updating of a set of beliefs which are used to represent the unambiguous preference
relation (Ghirardato et al. 2004), which is incomplete. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993)
analyze maximum likelihod updating, whereas Dempster (1968) and Shafer (1976)
suggest the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. Epstein (2006) provides an axiomatic
model of non-Bayesian updating.
Another property ofConsequentialism (whichwecallConditional Preference in this
paper and assume it throughout) is that conditional on an event E , the agent only cares
about what the act prescribes inside E . Dominiak et al. (2012) show experimentally
that subjects are more prone to violating DC than this property.
RSS identify the subjective beliefs generated by a large number of models of ambi-
guity aversion, based on an idea of Yaari (1969), making our approach very general.
These models are the convex Choquet model of Schmeidler (1989), the multiple priors
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the variational preferences model of Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006a), the multiplier model of Hansen and Sargent (2001), the smooth
second-order prior models of Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Nau (2006), the confidence
preferences model of Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) and the second-order expected
utility model of Ergin and Gul (2009).17 Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2018) extend the
approach of RSS to non convex preferences in order to characterize betting in terms
of disjoint beliefs.
In a setting with preferences over lotteries, Wakker (1988) shows that if Indepen-
dence is violated, the value of information is not always positive. Independence is
related to DC and, under some conditions (e.g. English auctions), it is equivalent
(Karni and Safra 1986). Grant et al. (2000) provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for a weakly dynamically consistent agent to always prefer more information.
Our approach differs from theirs in two respects. First, they adopt the definition of
“more information” suggested by Blackwell (1951), whereas we adopt the definition
of a finer partition.18 Second, they adopt a different weakening of DC, due to Machina
(1989), which requires that an agent conforms to what he would have chosen ex ante
only if he were able to commit. Snow (2010) examines the value of information in
the special case where it either reduces or eliminates ambiguity, using the model of
Klibanoff et al. (2005). Li (2020) studies the link between ambiguity attitudes and
aversion to receiving information when one is completely uninformed. Galanis (2015,
2016) examines the value of information in environments with unawareness, where
DC is violated. Finally, Galanis and Kotronis (Forthcoming) and Galanis et al. (2019)
study under which conditions financial markets aggregation information, when DC is
violated.
OpenAccess This article is licensedunder aCreativeCommonsAttribution 4.0 InternationalLicense,which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence,
17 Note that RSS adopts a domain of preferences over monetary acts, whereas these models allow for more
general domains.
18 The two definitions are closely related, as shown by Green and Stokey (1978).
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A Appendix
A.1 Revealed acts
In order to prove our results, we introduce the notion of revealed acts and connect it
with preference relation ∗. We have interpreted πuE,h( f ) as the set of (normalized)
Arrow-Debreu prices for which the agent with preferences E,h , endowed with f ,
would have zero net demand. The “dual” of πuE,h( f ) is the set of acts for which f is
revealed preferred to them. In particular, if Ep f ≥ Epg then act g is affordable given
normalized price p and endowment f . If p ∈ πuE,h( f ), then from Axiom 3 we have
f E,h g, which means that f is revealed preferred to g. Formally, for act f and
event E ∈ E , let RuE,h( f ) be the set of acts such that f is revealed preferred to them
given preferences E,h ,
RuE,h( f ) = {g ∈ F : Ep f ≥ Epg for some p ∈ πuE,h( f )}.
If we use beliefs πwE,h( f ), instead of π
u
E,h( f ), we get
RwE,h( f ) = {g ∈ F : Ep f ≥ Epg for some p ∈ πwE,h( f )}.
The connection between RwE,h,RuE,h and ∗E,h is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 For all f , g, h ∈ F , f ∗E,h g implies g ∈ RwE,h( f ) and g ∈ RuE,h( f )
implies f ∗E,h g.
Proof Suppose f ∗E,h g, then f E,h ag + (1 − a) f for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
g /∈ RwE,h( f ), so thatEp f < Epg for all p ∈ πwE,h( f ). Because πwE,h( f ) is a compact
and convex set, by definition we have εg + (1 − ε) f E,h f for sufficiently small
ε > 0, a contradiction. Conversely, suppose g ∈ RuE,h( f ), so that Ep f ≥ Epg for
some p ∈ πuE,h( f ). This implies that for all a ∈ [0, 1], Ep f ≥ aEpg + (1− a)Ep f .
Axiom 3 and the definition of πuE,h( f ) imply f E,h ag+(1−a) f , hence f ∗E,h g.
Proposition 1 in RSS shows that πE,h( f ) = πuE,h( f ) = πwE,h( f ) for all strictly
positive acts f ∈ F+. Hence, RuE,h( f ) = RwE,h( f ) ≡ RE,h( f ). Consider the fol-
lowing two axioms, which are equivalent of the two axioms of weak DC, Axioms 13
and 14.
Axiom 17 (Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F and
events E ∈ E , if g ∈ Ru( f ) and f =Ec g then f E, f g.
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Axiom 18 (Weak Information is Valuable) For all acts g ∈ F+, f ∈ F and events
E ∈ E , if f E, f g, f =Ec g and g  f then f /∈ Rw(g).
We therefore have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 For all f ∈ F+, g, h ∈ F , f ∗E,h g if and only if g ∈ RE,h( f ). Hence,
Axiom 13 is equivalent to Axiom 17 and Axiom 14 is equivalent to 18.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose Axioms 10, 12 and let f  g with f =Ec g. From
Axiom6, for all a ∈ (0, 1), a f +(1−a)g  g. Axiom12 implies a f +(1−a)g E,g g
for all a ∈ (0, 1). Because lim
a→1[a f + (1 − a)g] = f , Axiom 2 implies f E,g g.
Axiom 10 implies f E, f g.
Conversely, suppose Axioms 9, 11 and let f E, f gwith f =Ec g. FromAxiom 6,
for alla ∈ (0, 1),a f +(1−a)g E, f g. Axiom9 impliesa f +(1−a)g E,g g. Axiom
11 implies a f + (1 − a)g  g for all a ∈ (0, 1). Because lim
a→1[a f + (1 − a)g] = f ,
Axiom 2 implies f  g.
For the second claim, using Corollary 1 suppose Axioms 10, 14, g ∈ R( f ), f =Ec
g and g E, f f . Axiom 10 implies g E,g f . If f  g then Axiom 14 and
Corollary 1 imply g /∈ R( f ), a contradiction. Suppose g  f . FromAxiom 6we have
a f + (1−a)g  f for all a ∈ (0, 1). This implies that Ep(a f + (1−a)g) > Ep f for
all p ∈ π( f ). But then Epg > Ep f for all p ∈ π( f ) and g /∈ R( f ), a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose Axioms 9, 13, f E, f g, f =Ec g and g  f . From
Axiom 6, we have that a f + (1 − a)g E, f g for all a ∈ (0, 1). Axiom 9 implies
a f + (1− a)g E,g g. Axiom 13 and Corollary 1 imply that a f + (1− a)g /∈ R(g),
hence Ep(a f + (1− a)g) > Epg for all p ∈ π(g). But this implies that Ep f > Epg
for all p ∈ π(g), hence f /∈ R(g) and g ∗ f . 
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose that for some p ∈ πuE,h( f ) we have p(F) = 0. Take any
g such that g =Fc f . Because Ep f = Epg, we have f E,h g, implying that F
is weakly E,h-null. Conversely, suppose that for all acts f , p ∈ πwE,h( f ) implies
p(F) > 0. Suppose there exists act f such that for all g with f =Fc g, f E,h g. Let
k > 0 and define act g such that g(s) = f (s)+k if s ∈ F and g(s) = f (s) otherwise.
Then, for all p ∈ πwE,h( f ), Epg > Ep f . From the definition of πwE,h( f ), there exists
small enough ε > 0, such that g′ = εg + (1 − ε) f and g′  f . Because f =Fc g′,
we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1 Recall that convex preferences satisfyAxioms 1 through 5. Sup-
pose that for any event E ∈ E and all acts f , g ∈ F , f E, f g and f =Ec g implies
f  g. Consider decision problems D1 = {1,A} and D2 = {2,A}, where
1,2 ⊆ E are partitions of S and 1 is finer than 2. Let act f ∈ FD1 be optimal
for D1 and act g ∈ FD2 be optimal for D2. Since 2 is coarser than 1, FD2 ⊆ FD1
and g ∈ FD1 . This means that, for all E ∈ 1, f E, f g.
Enumerate the partition cells of1 = {E1, . . . , En}. If n = 1 then1 = {S} is the
uninformative partition and the result is immediate, so suppose that n ≥ 2. For cell
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1 ≤ k ≤ n define act hk as follows. Let hk(s) = f (s) if s ∈ E j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
and hk(s) = g(s) otherwise. Note that hn = f and let h0 = g. From Axiom 5 we
have that, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, f Ek , f g implies hk Ek , f hk−1. FromAxiom 10 we
have hk Ek ,hk hk−1. Applying Axiom 12 we have hk  hk−1, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Axiom 1 implies that f  g.
Conversely, suppose that Axiom 12 is false, so that for some event E ∈ E and
acts f , g ∈ F , we have f E, f g and f =Ec g but g  f . Consider partitions
1 = {E, Ec} and 2 = {S}. Let A = { f , g}. Then, g is optimal for decision
problem D2 = {2,A}. Because f =Ec g, Axiom 5 implies that f Ec, f g. Since
f E, f g, we have that f is optimal for decision problem D1 = {1,A}. Because
g  f , D1 is not more valuable than D2, hence information is not valuable.
For the second claim, supposeAxiom14,which fromCorollary 1 impliesAxiom18.
Consider the same decision problems as in the first paragraph of this proof (where now
A ⊆ F+) and let act f ∈ FD1 be optimal for D1 and act g ∈ FD2 be optimal for
D2. Since 2 is coarser than 1, FD2 ⊆ FD1 and g ∈ FD1 . This means that, for
all E ∈ 1, f E, f g. If f  g then for a = 1 we have a f + (1 − a)g  g and
information is weakly valuable.
Suppose g  f . For each E ∈ 1, Axiom 5 and f E, f g imply f Eg E, f g.
Axiom 10 implies that f Eg E, f Eg g. FromAxiom 18, either f Eg  g or g  f Eg
and f Eg /∈ R(g), which implies that Ep f Eg ≥ Epg for all p ∈ π(g). Because 1
is a partition of S, we have that Ep f ≥ Epg for all p ∈ π(g).
If it is not the case that f Eg ∼ g for some E ∈ 1, then either f Eg  g or
f Eg /∈ R(g), both implying Ep f Eg > Epg for all p ∈ π(g). Hence, if it is not the
case that f Eg ∼ g for some E ∈ 1, we have that Ep f > Epg for all p ∈ π(g). By
the definition of πw(g), there exists a ∈ (0, 1) such that a f + (1 − a)g  g, hence
information is weakly valuable.
Suppose now that for all E ∈ 1, f Eg ∼ g  f . Note that ∑
E∈1
1
k f Eg =
1
k f + k−1k g, where k is the number of 1’s partition cells. Because f Eg  g for each
E ∈ 1, Axiom 4 implies 1k f + k−1k g  g. By setting a = 1k , information is weakly
valuable.
Conversely, suppose that information is weakly valuable and Axiom 7 is satisfied.
Using Corollary 1, we only need to show that Axiom 18 is satisfied. Suppose that
for some event E ∈ E and acts f ∈ F , g ∈ F+, we have f E, f g, f =Ec g,
g  f but f ∈ R(g). Suppose f is not strictly positive, so that for some set A ⊆ E
(because g is strictly positive and f =Ec g), we have f (s) = 0 if and only if s ∈ A.
If Epg > Ep f for some p ∈ π(g), Axiom 2 implies that we can find strictly positive
act f ′ ∈ F+, by infinitesimally increasing the payoff for all states in A, such that
f ′ E, f g, f ′ =Ec g, g  f ′ but f ′ ∈ R(g). If Epg ≤ Ep f for all p ∈ π(g),
f ∈ R(g) implies Epg = Ep f for some p ∈ π(g). By taking a convex combination
of f and g, with large weight on f , Axioms 2, 4 and the definition of π imply that we
can find a strictly positive f ′ such that f ′ E, f g, f ′ =Ec g, g  f ′ but f ′ ∈ R(g).
From Axiom 10 we have f ′ E, f ′ g, so wlog we set f = f ′. Because f ∈ R(g),
we have that Epg ≥ Ep f for some p ∈ π(g). Construct the same decision problems,
D1 and D2, as in the third paragraph of the proof. Because information is weakly
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valuable and 1 is finer than 2, we have that D1 is weakly more valuable than D2.
This implies that a f + (1 − a)g  g for some a ∈ (0, 1].
From Axiom 4 we have that, for all b ∈ [0, 1], b(a f + (1 − a)g) + (1 − b)g =
ab f +(1−ab)g  g, hence, for all c ∈ (0, a], c f +(1−c)g  g. If c f +(1−c)g  g
for some c, thenEp(c f +(1−c)g) > Epg for all p ∈ π(g), contradictingEpg ≥ Ep f
for some p ∈ π(g). We therefore have c f + (1 − c)g ∼ g for all c ∈ (0, a]. Because
g  f , Axiom 7 is contradicted. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose subjective beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule. Fix
event E ∈ E and f ∈ F+. Suppose f ∗ g and f =Ec g. Using Corollary 1, we have
g ∈ R( f ). Then, Ep f ≥ Epg for some p ∈ π( f ). Axiom 8 and Lemma 2 imply that
p(E) > 0. Because subjective beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule and f =Ec g,
we have EpE f ≥ EpE g and pE ∈ πE, f ( f ). Axioms 1 and 3 imply f E, f g.
Conversely, supposeAxiom13 and that there exist f ∈ F+, p ∈ π( f )with p(E) >
0 and pE /∈ πE, f ( f ). Then, there exists act g such that g E, f f and EpE g = EpE f .
FromAxiom 5 we have gE f E, f f . BecauseEpE (gE f ) = EpE f and gE f =Ec f ,
we have that Ep(gE f ) = Ep f , hence gE f ∈ R( f ). From Corollary 1 Axiom 13
implies Axiom 17, hence f E, f gE f , a contradiction. 
The following is used in the proof of Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 8 Suppose that {E,h}E∈E,h∈F are convex variational or confidence prefer-
ences and satisfy Axiom 8, where u is concave, increasing and differentiable. Suppose
that for all f and all r ∈ M( f ), if r(E) > 0 then rE ∈ ME, f ( f ). Then, Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 13 are satisfied.
Proof We show that there is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and then invoke
Proposition 2, applied to strictly positive acts. Let U : RS+ → RS be the func-
tion U ( f ) = (u( f (1), . . . , u( f (S)))), giving ex post utilities in each state. For any
f ∈ RS++, let DU ( f ) be the S × S diagonal matrix with diagonal given by the
vector of ex post marginal utilities (u′( f (1), . . . , u′( f (S)))). From Propositions 3
(for variational preferences) and 4 (for confidence preferences) in RSS, we have that
π( f ) =
{
q
‖q‖ : q = pDU ( f ) for some p ∈ M( f )
}
.
Suppose q ∈ π( f ) and q(E) > 0 where, without loss of generality, ‖q‖ = 1 and
q = r DU ( f ) for r ∈ M( f ). This means that q(s) = r(s)u′( f (s)) for each s ∈ S.
Because rE ∈ ME, f ( f ),













r(s′)u′( f (s′))) = qE (s), which implies q ′E = qE ∈ πE, f ( f ). 
If u is strictly increasing, then Axiom 8 is equivalent to requiring that the ambiguity
index is finite only for beliefs that assign positive probability to all events in E .
Lemma 9 If u is strictly increasing, then Axiom 8 is equivalent to requiring that for
all E ∈ E and all p ∈ E, p(E) = 0 implies cE,h(p) = +∞.
123
Dynamic consistency, valuable information… 1491
Proof of Lemma 9 Fix F, E ∈ E with F ⊆ E and h ∈ F . We then need to show that
the following are equivalent.
• cE,h(p) = +∞ for some p ∈ E such that p(F) = 0,
• F is weakly E,h-null.
Let PF ⊆ E be such that p ∈ PF implies cE,h(p) = +∞ and p(F) = 0. Suppose
PF = ∅. Let fF,k be the act such that fF,k(s) = k > 0 if s ∈ F and fF,k(s) = 0
otherwise. For any act g and p ∈ PF , note that
∫
u(g)dp+c(p) = ∫ u(g+ fF,k)dp+
c(p) for all k > 0. This implies that for big enough k∗, ME,h(g + fF,k∗) ⊆ PF .
Moreover, for all k > 0, g + ( fF,k∗ + fF,k) ∼E,h g + fF,k∗ . Suppose there exists g′
with g+ fF,k∗ =Fc g′, such that g′ E,h g+ fF,k∗ . Set k′ = max
s∈F g
′(s). FromAxiom3,
g + ( fF,k∗ + fF,k′) E,h g′. But this implies g + ( fF,k∗ + fF,k′) E,h g + fF,k∗ , a
contradiction. Therefore, F is weakly E,h-null.
Conversely, suppose F is weakly E,h-null. Then, there exists g such that, for all
g′ with g =Fc g′, we have g E,h g′. Suppose that for each p ∈ E , p(F) = 0
implies cE,h(p) = +∞. Then, p ∈ ME,h( f ) implies p(F) > 0, for all f ∈ F .
Because
∫
u(g)dp + c(p) < ∫ u(g + fF,k)dp + c(p) for all p with p(F) > 0 and
some k > 0, we have that g + fF,k E,h g, a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 3 To show convexity of cE, f , we need to establish that cE, f (ap +
(1 − a)p′) ≤ acE, f (p) + (1 − a)cE, f c(p′) for all p, p′ ∈ E . Using (1), we
need to show that
∫
u( f )dnE, f (ap + (1 − a)p′) + c(nE, f (ap + (1 − a)p′)) ≤
a(
∫
u( f )dnE, f (p) + c(nE, f (p))) + (1 − a)(
∫
u( f )dnE, f (p′) + c(nE, f (p′))).
For the first rule, if cE, f (p), cE, f (p′) = +∞, then there exist q, q ′ ∈ S such that
p⊗E q, p′ ⊗E q ′ ∈ D f and c(p⊗E q), c(p′ ⊗E q ′) = +∞. From Lemma 1 in Araujo
et al. (2019) there exists b such that the Bayesian update of bp⊗E q+ (1−b)p′ ⊗E q ′
is ap + (1 − a)p′. From the convexity of c, c(bp ⊗E q + (1 − b)p′ ⊗E q ′) = +∞.
From the convexity of D f , bp ⊗E q + (1− b)p′ ⊗E q ′ ∈ D f and from the definition
of the updating rule, ap+ (1−a)p′ ∈ D fE and cE, f (ap+ (1−a)p′) = +∞. But this
means that nE, f (ap + (1 − a)p′) = nE, f (p) = nE, f (p′), so the inequality is true.
If cE, f (p) = +∞ or cE, f (p′) + ∞, then the inequality is trivially satisfied. For the
second rule, again from Lemma 1 in Araujo et al. (2019) and because p ⊗E r(E) =
p′ ⊗E r(E), we have that nE, f (ap + (1 − a)p′) = (ap + (1 − a)p′) ⊗E r =
ap ⊗E r + (1 − a)p′ ⊗E r , so the inequality is true.
To show lower semi continuity, note that for all p with cE, f (p) = +∞, for the first
updating rule the first two and the last term are constant, whereas the third term is a
linear function of p. For the second rule, cE, f (p) is the sum of continuous functions
of p.
To show Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs, suppose that q ∈ M( f ) and
q(E) > 0. For both updating rules, nE, f (qE ) = r for some r ∈ M( f ) with r(E) > 0
and rE = qE . Let pE ∈ E and denote nE, f (pE ) by p. We then have
∫
u( f )dr +
c(r) ≤ ∫ u( f )dp+c(p). By substituting from equation (1), we have that ∫ u( f )drE+
cE, f (rE )+ kE, f ≤
∫
u( f )dpE + cE, f (pE )+ kE, f , hence
∫
u( f )dqE + cE, f (qE ) ≤∫
u( f )dpE + cE, f (pE ) and qE ∈ ME, f ( f ). From Lemma 8, Bayesian updating of
subjective beliefs and Axiom 13 are satisfied.
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To show that D f = D for all f ∈ F and p ∈ D for all p with c(p) = +∞,
implies Axiom 11, suppose f  g and f =Ec g. This implies that
∫
u( f )dp +
c(p) ≥ ∫ u(g)dq + c(q), where p ∈ M( f ) and q ∈ M(g). Suppose that g E, f f .
Substituting from equation (1), we have that UE, f ( f ) =
∫
u( f )dr + c(r) − kE, f for
some fixed r ∈ M( f ) and UE, f (g) =
∫








u( f )dt , for all t ∈ DE .
Because p(E) > 0 for all p with c(p) = +∞ and q ∈ D, we have qE ∈ DE and∫
u(g)dqE >
∫




u( f )dqE implies that∫
u(g)dq + c(q) > ∫ u( f )dq + c(q) ≥ ∫ u( f )dp + c(p). Because p ∈ M( f ) and
q ∈ M(g) we have g  f , a contradiction.
To show that D f = M( f ), for all f ∈ F , implies Axiom 12, suppose that
f E, f g and f =Ec g. From the calculations of the previous paragraph, we have
that UE, f ( f ) ≥ UE, f (g) if and only if min
t∈D fE





u( f )dtE for some tE ∈ D fE . Since D f = M( f ), there
exists t ∈ M( f ) whose Bayesian update is tE . Because f =Ec g, we have that
U ( f ) = ∫ u( f )dt + c(t) ≥ ∫ u(g)dt + c(t) ≥ ∫ u(g)dq + c(q) = U (g), where
q ∈ M(g). This implies that f  g.
To show that these updating rules do not imply Axiom 11 and therefore fail DC,
consider the example of Sect. 1.1 with S = {s1, s2, s3} and E = {s1, s2}. The
agent has MEU ex ante preferences with u(x) = x and C being the convex hull
of the following three measures: p1 = (0.24, 0.33, 0.43), p2 = (0.34, 0.2, 0.46)
and p3 = (0.21, 0.68, 0.11). In this example each M( fi ) is a singleton, so that
M( f1) = M( f4) = {p3} and M( f2) = M( f3) = {p2}. The subjective beliefs consist
of the normalized vectors pDU ( fi ), where p ∈ M( fi ) and DU ( fi ) is a diagonal
matrix, with a diagonal consisting of the ex post marginal utilities, in this case 1’s.
We then have that π( f1) = π( f4) = {p3} and π( f2) = π( f3) = {p2}. Because u is
linear, f1  f2 and M( f1) = p3, where f1 = (1, 0, 0) and f2 = (0, 1, 0).
For the first updating rule, let D f1 be the convex hull of p1 and p3, hence M( f1) ⊆
D f1 and D f1E is the convex hull of p1E and p3E . We then have that UE, f1( f1) =
min
p∈D f1E
{∫ u( f1)dp + cE, f1(p)} =
∫
u( f )dp3 + c(p3) − kE, f1 and UE, f1( f2) =
min
p∈D f1E
{∫ u( f2)dp + cE, f1(p)} =
∫
u( f )dp3 + c(p3) − kE, f1 + min
p∈D f1E
{∫ u( f2)dp −
∫
u( f1)dp}. The last term simplifies to min
p∈D f1E
{u(1)p(s2) − u(1)p(s1)}. Because
p(s2) > p(s1) for all p ∈ D f1E , we have f2 E, f1 f1.
To show that Axiom 12 is violated, it is enough to show that f2 E, f2 f1.
Let D f2 be the convex hull of p2 and p3. Noting that M( f2) = {p2}, we have
UE, f2( f2) = min
p∈D f2E
{∫ u( f2)dp + cE, f2(p)} =
∫
u( f )dp2 + c(p2) − kE, f2 and
UE, f2( f1) = min
p∈D f2E
{∫ u( f1)dp + cE, f2(p)} =
∫
u( f )dp2 + c(p2) − kE, f2 +
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min
p∈D f2E
{∫ u( f1)dp −
∫
u( f2)dp}. The last term simplifies to min
p∈D f2E
{u(1)p(s1) −
u(1)p(s2)} = u(1)p3(E) (p3(s1) − u(1)p3(s2)) < 0, hence f2 E, f2 f1 but f1  f2.
For the second updating rule we set nE, f1(p) = p ⊗E p3. Let CE be the Bayesian
updates of all elements of C , given E , consisting of the convex hull of p1E , p2E and
p3E . Note that if p /∈ CE , then cE, f1(p) = +∞. Applying (1) and excluding constant
kE, f1 we haveUE, f1( f1) = min
p∈CE
{p(s1)+ p(s1)p3(E)− p(s1)} = p3(s1) = 0.21 and
UE, f1( f2) = min
p∈CE
{p(s2) + p(s1)p3(E) − p(s1)} = min
p∈CE
{1− p(s1)(1+ p3(s3))} =
1 − p2E (s1)(1 + p3(s3)) = 0.3011. Hence, f2 E, f1 f1. 





, where φ(r)kE,hEr u(h)
is constant. Hence, quasiconcavity and upper semicontinuouty are satisfied. Proposi-
tion 4 in RSS shows that π(h) =
{
q
‖q‖ : q = pDU (h) for some p ∈ M(h)
}
.
To show Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs, suppose that q ∈ M(h) and
q(E) > 0.Byconstruction,qE ∈ DhE .Moreover, for all p ∈ DhE , Epu(h)φE,h(p) = kE,h
Er u(h)
φ(r)
for some fixed r ∈ M(h) with r(E) > 0, so it is independent of p. Hence, qE ∈
ME,h(h) = LaE,h = DhE . From Lemma 8, Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs
and Axiom 13 are satisfied.
Suppose now that D f = D = La , for all f ∈ F , and for all p ∈ D we have
p(E) > 0, f  g and f =Ec g. This implies that Epu( f )φ(p) ≥ Equ(g)φ(q) , where p ∈
M( f ) and q ∈ M(g). Suppose that g E, f f . Substituting from (2) we have that
UE, f ( f ) = kE, fφ(r) Er u( f ) for some r ∈ M( f ) andUE, f (g) = kE, fφ(r) Er u( f ) mint∈DE
Et u(g)
Et u( f )
.
Because g E, f f , we have that Et u(g) > Et u( f ), for all t ∈ DE . In particular,
EqE u(g) > EqE u( f ) and, since f =Ec g, we have Equ(g)φ(q) > Equ( f )φ(q) ≥ Epu( f )φ(p) , a
contradiction.
To show that D f = M( f ), for all f ∈ F , implies Axiom 12, suppose that
f E, f g and f =Ec g. From the calculations of the previous paragraph, we
have that UE, f ( f ) ≥ UE, f (g) if and only if min
t∈D fE
Et u(g)
Et u( f )
≤ 1, which implies that
EtE u(g) ≤ EtE u( f ) for some tE ∈ D fE . Since D f = M( f ), there exists t ∈ M( f )
whose Bayesian update is tE . Because f =Ec g, we have thatU ( f ) = 1φ(t)Et u( f ) ≥
1
φ(t)Et u(g) ≥ 1φ(q)Equ(g) = U (g), where q ∈ M(g). This implies that f  g.
We now show that if Dh is a strict subset of La , Axiom 11 and therefore DC may
be violated. Consider the example of Sect. 1.1, with S = {s1, s2, s3} and E = {s1, s2}.
The agent has MEU ex ante preferences with u(x) = x and La being the convex hull
of the following three measures: p1 = (0.24, 0.33, 0.43), p2 = (0.34, 0.2, 0.46) and
p3 = (0.21, 0.68, 0.11). Note that MEU is a special case of confidence preferences,
where φ(p) = 1 if p ∈ La and 0 otherwise, whereas a = 1/2. As we showed there,
f1  f2 and M( f1) = p3, where f1 = (1, 0, 0) and f2 = (0, 1, 0).
Let D f1  La be the convex hull of p1 and p3, hence M( f1) ⊆ D and D f1E is





, otherwise φE, f1(p) = 0. By construction, LaE, f1 = DE .
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Ep3u( f1) = kE, f1φ(p3)


















. Because p(s2) > p(s1) for all p ∈ DE , we have f2 E, f1
f1. 
Proof of Lemma 5 Suppose Axiom 15, f ∗AA g and f =Ec g. This implies that
f  a f +(1−a)g for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Let B = {h ∈ A : h = a f +(1−a)g, a ∈ [0, 1]}
be a convex budget set. We then have that f is optimal in B. Applying Axiom 15, we
have f E, f g and Axiom 16 is satisfied.
Conversely, suppose Axiom 16 and take (, E, f , B) ∈ D with g ∈ B and f =Ec
g. Because f , g ∈ B and B is convex, a f + (1 − a)g ∈ B for all a ∈ [0, 1]. The
optimality of f implies that f  a f + (1 − a)g. Hence, f ∗AA g and Axiom 16
implies f E, f g, so that Axiom 15 is satisfied. 
Proof of Lemma 6 Let U : RS+ → RS be the function U ( f ) = (u( f (1), . . . ,
u( f (S)))), giving ex post utilities in each state. For any f ∈ RS+, let DU ( f ) be
the S × S diagonal matrix with diagonal given by the vector of ex post marginal
utilities (u′( f (1), . . . , u′( f (S)))). Let DU ( f )(s) be the s-th element of the diag-
onal. From Proposition 5 in RSS, the set of subjective beliefs is a singleton,
given by π( f ) = Eμ[φ′(Epu◦ f )pDU ( f )]‖Eμ[φ′(Epu◦ f )pDU ( f )]‖ , where ‖Eμ[φ′(Epu ◦ f )pDU ( f )]‖ =∑
s′∈S
Eμ[φ′(Epu ◦ f )p(s′)]DU ( f )(s′).
Given event E and act f , the subjective belief becomes πE ( f ) =
EμE, f [φ′(EpE u◦ f )pE DU ( f )]
‖EμE, f [φ′(EpE u◦ f )pE DU ( f )]‖ .
Let q = π( f ), with q(E) > 0 and q ′ = πE, f ( f ). We need to show that for each
s ∈ E , q(s)q(E) = q ′(s), or that
EμE, f [φ′(EpE u ◦ f )pE (s)]DU ( f )(s)∑
s′∈E
EμE, f [φ′(EpE u ◦ f )pE (s′)]DU ( f )(s′)
= Eμ[φ
′(Epu ◦ f )p(s)]DU ( f )(s)
∑
s′∈E
Eμ[φ′(Epu ◦ f )p(s′)]DU ( f )(s′) . (5)
Set k(s) = EμE, f [φ
′(EpE u◦ f )pE (s)]
EμE, f [φ′(EpE u◦ f )] =
Eμ[φ′(Epu◦ f )p(s)]
Eμ[φ′(Epu◦ f )]p(E) for all s ∈ E . By sub-
stituting the equalities EμE, f [φ′(EpE u ◦ f )pE (s)] = k(s)EμE, f [φ′(EpE u ◦ f )] and
Eμ[φ′(Epu ◦ f )p(s)] = k(s)Eμ[φ′(Epu ◦ f )]p(E) in (5), Bayesian updating of
subjective beliefs is satisfied. 
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